The emerging market for European corporate governance: the relationship between governance and capital expenditures, 1997–2005. by Bauer, Rob et al.
Journal of Economic Geography 8 (2008) pp. 441–469 doi:10.1093/jeg/lbn018
Advance Access Published on 22 May 2008
The emerging market for European corporate
governance: the relationship between governance
and capital expenditures, 1997–2005
Rob Bauer*, Robin Braun* and Gordon L. Clark**
Abstract
We examine European corporate governance with respect to the relationship between
shareholder value and capital investment. Based upon Europe’s largest listed compa-
nies, it is shown that Anglo-American conceptions of shareholder value are increasingly
important for European firms whatever their home jurisdictions and inherited traditions.
Using annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) as a proxy for corporate managers’ commit-
ment to shareholder value, it is shown, contra arguments to the effect that the map
of European corporate governance regimes is fixed and virtually immutable, even large
firms from paradigmatic stakeholder regimes believed focused upon long-term value
increasingly act to maximize short-term shareholder value. We divide Europe into
three regions based on ownership concentration, legal systems, board structures and
the presence of corporate governance codes. In this multi-jurisdictional setting,
we compare the effects of different elements of corporate governance on CAPEX in
each region. Our analysis shows that the overall effect of investor-sensitive corporate
governance on CAPEX is consistently negative notwithstanding differences in the formal
nature and quality of governance standards between regions. We explain this finding by
reference to the governance standards of the United Kingdom: a market for corporate
governance that has come to dominate its continental European neighbours.
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1. Introduction
There is a growing European market for corporate governance. Large continental
companies appear to be adopting shareholder-friendly practices more consistent with
global financial market imperatives than their national traditions. In particular,
we argue in this article that the market for corporate control is increasingly important
in promoting short- and medium-term shareholder value. Whatever the formal signif-
icance of concentrated ownership regimes in continental European countries, managers
appear to be discounting long-term stakeholder value. Whereas Dore (2000) contrasts
the Anglo-American approach of revenue and cash distribution to shareholders
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and investment, we seek to show that large European firms are more short-term
oriented than hitherto acknowledged.
By convention, there are two approaches to the study of corporate governance
and shareholder value. The first, believed practiced by continental European and
Japanese firms, assumes concentrated ownership and capital intensity with investment
focused on the generation of long-term value. According to Dore (2000, 187), in this
type of regime ‘profits represent the cash available for investments or wage increases
rather than the size of the capitalists ‘‘take’’’. This model of governance seeks to satisfy
multiple ‘insider’ stakeholders assuming that short-termism would otherwise undermine
long-term competitiveness. In contrast, in Anglo-American governance systems inves-
tors and portfolio managers favour the short-term distribution of excess cash over
retained earnings (Aguilera et al., 2007). In part, this is due to a distrust of managers
who are suspected of hubris and a propensity for empire-building. Equally, investors
might not be able to estimate the economic benefits of medium- and long-term invest-
ment. These stylized facts have dominated research on comparative corporate
governance over the past few decades (Hopt et al., 1998; McCahery et al., 2002;
Gordon and Roe, 2004).
Case studies have challenged the robustness of these ‘facts’. For example, it has been
shown that when global investors demanded greater transparency and board indepen-
dence at Royal Ahold, management responded with board reform (Clark et al., 2006).
Likewise, it is apparent that shareholder pressure led to Ju ¨ rgen Schrempp’s resignation
at DaimlerChrysler AG; his vision of a ‘world corporation’ was not realized with
consequent poor rates of return for global investors. As a result, the Chrysler unit was
sold-off to the US private equity firm Cerberus in May 2007. Global institutional
investors including hedge-funds have routinely targeted large European blue chip
companies cross-listed at international exchanges. In play are both the short-term
trajectory of company stock market prices and the governance of those companies
recognizing that board structure and performance are intimately related to the sensitiv-
ity of external constituents in targeted firms (Becht et al., 2003).
In this article, we argue that it is not plausible to assume an immutable European
map of corporate governance regimes; in fact, there is evidence that the management
behaviour of Europe’s largest firms is increasingly consistent with the market for
corporate control (Clark and Wo ´ jcik, 2007). In doing so, we go beyond case studies
to a systematic analysis of 395 European firms testing for regime-specific differences in
the relationship between corporate governance, management behaviour and share-
holder value. To do so, we use annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) as a proxy for
manager behaviour. Research in the US using this variable showed that lower CAPEX
lead to higher market valuation and stock market performance (Gompers et al., 2003).
In a related paper, Titman et al. (2004) showed that US investors react positively to
reductions in CAPEX because investors infer that lower CAPEX will produce higher
distributed dividends in the future. Basically, institutional investors are suspicious
of managers of companies with weak shareholder rights, believing managers invest for
their own benefit (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Yermack, 2006).
Here, we assume that manager commitment to shareholder value is manifested in the
pattern of corporate CAPEX. This relationship is evaluated in relation to investor-
sensitive elements of corporate governance while controlling for other factors influenc-
ing companies’ investment decisions. Disaggregate data is used to measure corporate
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rating agency. In particular, we test this relationship across European governance
regimes using three ‘regions’ based upon inherited legal traditions, market structure and
the prevalence of formal codes of governance. In the empirical sections (4.1–4.5) of the
article, we test for the existence of a continental European approach to shareholder
value and CAPEX. We hypothesize (i) there is a significant effect of corporate
governance on management behaviour and (ii) managers have adopted practices
consistent with the preferences and actions of global portfolio investors.
Our study contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on corporate governance and
economic geography in two ways. First, we provide evidence to the effect that corporate
governance has an impact on management behaviour and performance. We show that
governance, and the range of takeover defences (TD) in particular, can affect managers’
CAPEX.
1 Companies with a high score on overall investor-sensitive corporate gover-
nance and low takeover barriers invest less than their industry peers. Second, we find
that these results hold across Europe notwithstanding the historical significance attrib-
uted to three different regimes of corporate governance. As a result, it is contended that
managers are adopting practices consistent with the interests of global investors even if
convergence between national models of corporate governance is less systematic than
hoped for by global portfolio investors. Even managers domiciled in countries with less
well established governance codes and limited takeover markets appear to be adjusting
to Anglo-American expectations regarding shareholder value. In these ways, the United
Kingdom is the litmus-test for European corporate governance.
The article is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents theoretical
aspects of the debate about corporate governance and convergence, and explains how
governance and patterns of corporate CAPEX may be related. We also summarize what
is expected in terms of the empirical results. Thereafter, the data on governance and
corporate financial performance are explained as is the methodology used to test the
research hypotheses. Section 4 summarizes the empirical results, which are discussed
in more detail in Section 5 both in general and from the perspective of economic
geography. Finally, the conclusion draws implications for future research and notes
possible short-comings in the analysis.
2. Theory of European corporate governance
Corporate governance differs across countries in terms of ownership concentration and
board structures, legal heritage and management authority. Nonetheless, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) distinguish between two generic regimes. Dispersed ownership regimes
typically have an active market for corporate control, where short-term shareholder
value is the company’s primary objective. If typical of Anglo-American countries,
continental Europe is characterized by concentrated ownership and controlling
‘insiders’ who directly monitor and discipline management. In theory, companies in
1 Throughout, we refer to the elements of corporate governance relevant to institutional investors and the
formal models of governance embedded in nation–state rules and regulations. In effect there is a
distinction made between the theory and practice of corporate governance, emphasizing the latter in
relation to the former. Hence, our study is relevant to debate in economic geography over the varieties of
capitalism and path dependence (Peck and Theodore, 2007), and argument in governance studies over the
political structure of national traditions (Roe, 2006; Monk, 2008).
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(Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). Unlike continental Europe, public companies in the
United Kingdom and Ireland tend to have highly dispersed owners such that almost
everyone is an ‘outsider’ and the threat of being taken over is, presumably, the
disciplining force on management. Continental Europe firms also carry the burden of
more detailed and rigid regulations compared with the principles approach that holds
sway in the UK.
In response to the governance scandals of the first years of the decade, it appears
that many larger European firms have adopted more shareholder-friendly practices.
Companies either signal increasing commitment to governance quality by cross-listing
on international exchanges or by their voluntary compliance with higher transparency
and investor-friendly standards. It is often contended that superior systems of corporate
governance are to be found in the United States and in the United Kingdom; it is widely
believed that as global capital markets become more integrated and more correlated
in terms of performance, continental European companies are likely to converge to
international best-practice standards of governance.
2 According to Clark and Wo ´ jcik
(2007, 34), it is also widely believed that best-practice is considered by market agents to
be a ‘perfected version of Anglo-American corporate governance with its primary
objective of maximizing shareholder value [...] and firms’ access to external funds’.
Just as European corporate governance has been changing in response to globaliza-
tion, institutional investors through their corporate engagement strategies have become
important in accelerating change. In a number of cases, institutional investors have
sought to influence the corporate governance and transparency of blue chip companies
(Hebb, 2006). More generally, investors have become more explicit about their evalua-
tion of corporate governance deliberately referencing international standards in the
assessment processes.
3 On the basis of governance best-practice, they have lobbied
management to improve their practices and governments to develop national codes
consistent with global standards. Consequently, the shareholder value perspective has
become more significant irrespective of the legal environment in which target companies
are headquartered. Given that Anglo-American standards of corporate governance are
often invoked as representative of ‘best-practice’, we hypothesize that large continental
European firms increasingly behave like UK-based companies with regard to CAPEX
and retained earnings.
To illustrate, consider the recent history of Royal Ahold and DaimlerChrysler.
Between 1998 and 2001, the Dutch retailer Royal Ahold engaged in worldwide acquisi-
tions totalling 16.4 billion Euros (Wrigley and Currah, 2003). Most acquisitions
took place in South America but were rather unsuccessful when judged by the return
on capital invested. Deficient corporate governance practices, lax internal controls
and media-hype had ceded the CEO considerable control over investment decisions.
A clinical study by de Jong et al. (2005) revealed that the company’s shareholders
2 The idea of global best-practice is contested in economic geography, given the path-dependence of
national traditions and institutions (Gertler, 2001). Here, we refer to a decision-relevant reference point
for institutional investors rather than an absolute measure of institutional quality that dominates the
design of national governance systems.
3 We note that institutional investors tend to evaluate ‘good corporate governance’ from the perspective of
their equity holdings, thereby neglecting creditors. In this article, we focus on the former evaluation
process (see Cremers et al., 2007 on the relationship between bondholders and corporate governance).
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empire building. Another, more recent, instance is DaimlerChrysler AG. Its former
CEO’s idea of a ‘world corporation’ involved global acquisitions and diversification
into unrelated fields. Shareholder disapproval of this strategy and perceived excess
investing resulted in inferior stock market performance in the years subsequent to the
acquisitions. Institutional investors became impatient with the strategy of global
expansion and diversification; poor operating performance led to the disposal of the
Chrysler unit in 2007.
The cases of Royal Ahold and DaimlerChrysler demonstrate institutional investors’
sceptical views about corporate investment in fixed assets. Assuming managers invest in
order to create shareholder value, CAPEX and the value of earnings retained or
distributed to shareholders are deemed indicative of incumbent managers’ approaches
towards value creation. CAPEX are, of course, vital for any company—in theory,
CAPEX sustain a firm’s competitiveness assuming that discounted future cash flows
exceed costs. Here, we demonstrate empirically thatthere is a systematic link between the
measured quality of the elements of investor-sensitive corporate governance and the
relative value of CAPEX holding constant capital demand, cash flow and cash
availability. If expectations of best-practice governance exert a disciplining influence on
managers’ investment decisions and constrains the potential for empire-building, by this
logicmanagersshouldidentifyonlyprofitableprojectsagainstrigorousinternalcontrols.
It is entirely possible, of course, that such discipline or the threat of discipline
encourages risk-averse behaviour resulting in chronic under-investment. This need
not be beneficial over the long-term for investors and other stakeholders including
employees (Stein, 1988). However, institutional investors typically manage such risks
through portfolio diversification so that long-term investor commitment is unusual.
As a consequence, local stakeholders may be the losers in these circumstances;
managers face a trade-off between serving institutional investors, long-term competi-
tiveness and playing favourites with local stakeholders.
4
Our hypothesized relationships are explored with reference to three European
governance regions or regimes. We test for the existence of differences in the proposed
relationship across regimes, consistent with those that suppose that the differentiated
map of corporate governance produces systematic differences in financial structure and
performance (La Porta et al., 2002). We also allow for the possibility that shared
financial market imperatives drive manager behaviour such that whatever the formal
differences between European regimes of corporate governance, managers are increas-
ingly sensitive to the significance of CAPEX for institutional investor expectations (the
argument underpinning Clark and Wo ´ jcik, 2007). If we can show that across European
regimes of governance the sign on the relationship between corporate governance and
CAPEX is the same, this will be used as evidence for convergence in management
behaviour. Even though there are different types of governance codes across Europe,
many of which are not equally legally binding, it could be observed that managers
in companies from ‘weaker’ governance regimes opt for behaviour consistent with
Anglo-American standards.
4 Recent papers that have addressed companies’ relationship to local stakeholders and employees include
Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Cestone and Cespa (2007) who provided evidence of managers exploiting
their relationships with stakeholders.
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governance codes. Disclosure on whether companies comply (mostly based on the
doctrine of ‘comply or explain’) with these codes can be either a function of prevalent
local listing requirements or embedded in national law. In other countries like Sweden
and Norway, formal codes of governance that match or mirror international standards
have only recently been introduced. So as to capture these developments, we use three
European regions designed to reflect differences in board structure, governance codes
and legal traditions. This allows us to compare the effect of governance on CAPEX
across European regions before pooling the samples into continental European and
pan-European samples. That corporate governance codes may have an effect on firm
investment has been readily noted in the literature. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)
analysed the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for US-listed companies’ share
price performance and market valuation. They concluded that the effect is positive for
large-cap companies and less positive for small firms. Our analysis focuses on large-cap
stocks in Europe, which are the subjects of governance strategies by investment
institutions.
Prior work by Gompers et al. (2003) sought to explain the financial outperformance
of well-governed US companies over badly governed counterparts. They showed that
well-governed companies engage in less CAPEX and less acquisitions. However, their
estimate of governance quality was rather idiosyncratic. Furthermore, it would be
difficult to show that their measure is recognized as such in the actions of institutional
investors. Titman et al. (2004) also investigated the capital investment and return
relationship concluding that shareholders view a reduction in CAPEX positively. Here,
in contrast, we take a direct approach to the issue of governance quality and use data
provided by a dedicated governance rating agency. In particular, we investigate four
elements of investor-sensitive corporate governance plus an overall governance score:
the rights and duties of shareholders (RDS), the TD, disclosure on corporate gover-
nance (DCG) and board structure and functioning (BSF). The rating database that
we use is based upon the FTSE EuroTop 300 largest European companies. Large
institutional investors use this database to inform their investment decisions. Hence,
our analysis directly reflects elements that institutional investors believe important
when considering investment strategies.
We motivate our analysis in the following way. Firms with higher overall scores
on investor-sensitive corporate governance should be more prudent on CAPEX. The
subscores on the TD and BSF should, in theory, also lead to more prudent capital
investment. If managers are entrenched and isolated from the market for corporate
control, they will face less pressure to create short-term shareholder value. Expectations
about the direction of association on the RDS and DCG cannot be made a priori but
we expect these variables to affect investment decisions. With more rights, managers
may grant (minority) shareholders more power to influence corporate strategy. Since
DCG includes the transparency of remuneration practices, this element helps investors
hold managers accountable on investment. BSF is the fourth category in the data-
base and refers to the quality and robustness of internal controls. If managers face
vigilant supervision and audits, they may invest more efficiently and be less prone to
conceal perks.
Most importantly, we expect the effect of investor-sensitive corporate gover-
nance variables on CAPEX to be similar across Europe despite being tested in a
multi-jurisdictional setting. In continental Europe, controlling insider shareholders
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the UK this influence is typically located in the market for corporate control. There
is ongoing debate as to whether market agents view reductions in CAPEX positively or
negatively. Royal Ahold’s stock price had shown adverse movements before the actual
date of earnings restatement, which indicates that some financial analysts had made
negative assessments about the consequences of lavish corporate spending (see generally
Yermack, 2006). The problems of the continental European model of corporate gover-
nance were widely recognized in the late 1990s, even before they became apparent in
Ahold and DaimlerChrysler. Given the leverage of institutional investors, and empirical
evidence to the effect that shareholders prefer lower CAPEX, we expect managers
to adopt Anglo-American practices even if nation-specific regimes remain wedded to
political interests (compare Roe, 2006).
3. Study data and methodology
3.1. Data
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Europe (formerly Deminor Ratings S.A.)
provides scores on European corporate governance standards.
5 The time horizon of the
database is unusual in that no other European scoring system focused on investor-
sensitive categories of governance covers the same period. Four broad categories sum
to a Total governance score. The first category RDS can be described as the extent
to which (minority) shareholders are able to influence a company’s actions. The second
category TD charts the potential barriers to hostile takeovers thereby protecting
management from the market for corporate control. DCG summarizes the availability
and quality of financial and non-financial information. Finally, BSF evaluates board
diversity, experience and the independence of board members, as well as the insider/
outsider mix and remuneration practices.
Scores range from 0 to 10 and are updated by Deminor on a yearly basis. The
available data used in our article ranges from 2000 to 2005. Excluded from the analysis
are 20 companies from Austria, Greece, Portugal and Luxemburg since firms from
those countries are not continuously rated. In order to increase the time horizon and
thereby upgrade the statistical validity of our tests, we extended the ratings backwards
by three additional years by holding 2000 scores constant to 1997. Since ratings hardly
changed over the period 2000–2002, we believe that this is a reasonable approach.
Deminor covered a total 395 companies over the 6-year period. We are aware that using
this database depends upon the skill and expertise of the rating agency. But we contend
that Deminor has proven to be an effective analyst both for individual companies and
across European regions. In any event, Deminor measures are more systematic and
consistent on crucial issues than other similar approaches extant in the literature (cf.
Gompers et al., 2003).
The main users of the database are institutional investors, who use the ratings as a
baseline for their investment decisions. Information gathered by analysts to produce
5 In the following, we refer to the governance database as the ‘Deminor’ database. A detailed description of
the database and its categories can be found in Appendix A (see also Wo ´ jcik, 2006; Clark and Wo ´ jcik,
2007).
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to reflect market information rather than inside information (Wilhelm and Downing,
2001). The database is comprehensive and ratings do not place equal weight on the
measured provisions as in Gompers et al.’ s (2003) synthetic self-constructed G-score.
The Deminor rating algorithm takes into account approximately 300 characteristics
to arrive at a weighted rating score. Bauer et al. (2004) have used the Deminor database
to investigate the possible outperformance of well-governed over badly governed
European companies. Renders and Gaeremynck (2006) used the same information to
study the link between governance and operating performance from an accounting
perspective. Finally, Wo ´ jcik et al. (2005) used the database to check for differences in
governance ratings for cross-listed firms.
The second database comes from Worldscope. CAPEX were derived from firms’
cash flow statements and counts as ‘additions to fixed assets’. Data was obtained
on firm’s total assets (TA) and sales revenues (SR) with, as well, data for control
variables including trailing 3-year sales growth (SG3Y), the price-to-book ratio (PB)
and Tobin’s q. Additionally, we utilized cash flow to sales ratio (CFS), and firms’
cash ratio (CR), which is defined by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) as the ratio
of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (balance sheet TA minus cash and cash
equivalents). Finally, we included a debt-to-assets ratio (DA) variable to capture
capital-structure effects. Tobin’s q is the market value of assets divided by the
replacement value of assets. Market value is approximated by the sum of the book value
of assets and the market value of firm equity. From this, the book value of equity is
subtracted. The replacement value of the assets is simply the book value of assets.
Although there are more sophisticated measures of capturing Tobin’s metric, we
assume that this is a reasonable approximation. Log PB represents the natural loga-
rithm of the ratio of the market value of equity and book value of equity (plus balance
sheet deferred taxes). A full list of financial variables is in Appendix B.
Since the variables are ratios, currency effects are not considered. Even though a
sizeable number of companies in the sample went through major restructuring during
this period with name changes, merger activities and bankruptcies our database remains
robust over the sample period. Table 1 reveals how our sample is distributed across
western European countries.
The heterogeneity of nation-wide corporate governance codes and prescriptions in
the countries under investigation is illustrated in Table 1, column 2. We investigate
three distinct European regions in order to test for statistically significant differences in
the relationship between corporate governance and investment. The country with the
most robust corporate governance code is the United Kingdom. Since the UK stock
market is highly liquid and because ownership is dispersed, takeover barriers are low,
and the market for corporate control is active (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). Moreover,
according to La Porta et al. (2002), the UK’s common law heritage plays a significant
role in underpinning market liquidity. Therefore, as suggested by Tirole (2001), firms in
the UK are more likely to embrace the concept of shareholder value: it is the reference
jurisdiction for much of continental Europe.
Most continental European companies are located in civil law systems. Furthermore,
continental Europe is often characterized as being bank-driven whereas the UK
and Ireland are deemed governed by financial markets. The broad concept of
stakeholder society, which is prevalent in continental Europe, suggests a more
complex objective function than that summarized by the phrase shareholder value
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system, where stakeholders like banks, labour unions and community representatives sit
with executives on companies’ supervisory boards (Dore, 2000). As such, region one is
comprised of two-tier structured systems, whereas both region two and the United
Kingdom and Ireland have unitary boards. Finally, as shown in column 2 of Table 1,
the three regions have different histories of corporate governance codes and thus may
function differently. Formal differences in corporate governance are manifested in
countries’ Deminor ratings as shown in Table 2. The lower part of Table 2 also shows
descriptive statistics on a regional level.
As expected, the United Kingdom together with Ireland had by far the highest total
scores on investor-sensitive corporate governance. As noted earlier, this is due to the
active market for corporate control and the limited significance of takeover defences.
Consequently, scores on the TD category are very high. The particularly low scores
on TD in Italy, Spain and Denmark are probably due to the frequent presence of golden
shares and ownership ceilings.
6 In columns 3 and 4 (Table 2), both UK and Ireland take
leading positions. Due to large supervisory boards and limited commitment to indepen-
dent boards of directors, Germany scores very low on BSF. Surprisingly, Germany
scores high on RDS, which might be partly attributable to employee codetermination
laws. If we focus on the time-series behaviour of our relevant corporate governance
and CAPEX variables, we can confirm the growing importance of governance in the
Table 1. Overview of countries in the sample and data size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country
Date of issuance of
first governance code
Average no.
of companies Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
Belgium 1998 10 X
Denmark 2000/2005 5 X
Finland 2003 5 X
France 1995/1998 40 X
Germany 1998/2002 30 X
Ireland 2000 5 X
Italy 1999/2003 23 X
Norway 2004 4 X
Spain 1998/2003 12 X
The Netherlands 1997/2003 20 X
Sweden 2005 17 X
Switzerland 2003 17 X
United Kingdom 1992/2000 82 X
Total 270 100 83 87
Note: Covered countries in the sample, average number of companies per country from 2000 to 2005 and regional
belonging. Criteria of belonging to any of the three regions have been shown in Section 3.1. of the text. The last row shows
the total average number of companies in the sample and per region. The date of issuance of the prevailing governance
codes was according to the index of codes and principles of the European Corporate Governance Institute’s website (2006)
(www.ecgi.org). If two dates are stated in column two the most recent date refers to a revision.
6 A ‘golden share’ is defined as the government having the final decision over changes in control
(i.e. takeovers) or major financial decisions if they endanger national interests (Damodaran, 2002).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country RDS TD DCG BSF Total
CAPEX/SR
(ADJ) PB Q SG3Y CFS CR DA
Belgium 6.2083 1.1128 4.8929 4.7158 16.9297  0.0073 2.2553 0.8912 0.1581 0.4998 0.0858 0.2623
Switzerland 5.9189 3.3847 4.3885 3.7601 17.2336  0.0271 3.2955 1.3462 0.0625 0.1586 0.1537 0.2255
Denmark 5.7165 1.5897 4.0636 3.1029 14.4727 0.1456 6.1084 3.9102 0.2390 0.5996 0.1250 0.2098
Finland 6.9935 4.6166 6.0276 4.6234 22.2611  0.0206 4.0040 1.8415 0.1630 0.1924 0.1299 0.2399
Spain 5.5134 1.4762 5.1233 4.6543 16.7672 0.0277 3.1832 4.4515 0.1747 0.1778 0.0895 0.2943
France 6.3449 3.2012 5.3962 5.0234 19.9657 0.0226 3.2251 1.0098 0.0952 0.1235 0.1223 0.2572
Germany 7.0659 3.5000 5.1094 3.3673 19.0426  0.0007 3.2841 0.9751 0.0964 0.1220 0.1278 0.2157
Ireland 7.0012 8.8515 6.8883 6.4554 29.1963 0.0125 5.1289 0.8782 0.2139 0.1396 0.1919 0.3401
Italy 6.4288 1.6853 5.7933 4.2773 18.1847  0.0152 2.8813 0.6379 0.1168 0.2224 0.0691 0.3142
Netherlands 4.9291 1.7890 5.7222 4.4905 16.9308 0.1059 5.1537 1.8580 0.1268 0.1496 0.1220 0.2783
Norway 7.4036 2.4132 4.8117 3.9285 18.5570 0.0286 1.8257 0.7025 0.1094 0.1293 0.1308 0.2872
Sweden 6.0688 4.8288 5.0817 4.2050 20.1842  0.0003 3.2331 1.2598 0.0975 0.1203 0.1344 0.2784
UK 6.9006 7.0724 7.3691 6.5528 27.6644 0.0358 3.7877 1.7600 0.1007 0.1465 0.1384 0.2750
Region 1 6.2470 2.7975 5.3333 4.4075 18.7854 0.0281 3.5224 1.1633 0.1065 0.1604 0.1208 0.3028
Region 2 6.1495 2.8567 5.1443 4.1529 18.2513 0.0063 3.3181 1.7682 0.1217 0.2045 0.1113 0.3610
UK and Ireland 6.9060 7.1677 7.3429 6.5475 27.7464 0.0344 3.8680 1.7069 0.1070 0.1461 0.1416 0.2664
Note: This table shows time-series average values of the four Deminor subscores and financials in the 13 European countries in the sample. Columns 1 until 5 show averages of the
governance scores whereas the remaining columns present averages of the dependent variables (columns 6 and 7) and the control variables (columns 8 to 12). The abbreviations and meanings
for the variables in columns (1) until (5) are as defined in the text and in Appendix A. CAPEX/SR(ADJ) resembles capital expenditures scaled by sales revenue and is adjusted for the
industry median. Q is the market value of the assets divided by the replacement value of the assets. CR is cash and cash equivalents over net assets (balance sheet total assets minus cash and
cash equivalents). PB ratio is market value of the firm’s common equity divided by the book value. SG3Y is trailing three year sales growth and CFS is the firm’s cash flow to sales ratio.














.raw data. Since we assume Deminor scores represent institutional investors’ awareness
of corporate governance standards, we interpret an increasing score as growing
importance. The Total score strictly and monotonously increases in every corporate
governance region, whereas the variable of scaled and adjusted CAPEX does not
increase. The industries covered in the sample are listed in Table 3. The table reveals
differences in corporate governance ratings among European industrial sectors. Both
telecoms and utilities score comparatively low on the TD. One explanation is that
governments frequently own golden shares in firms in these sectors, which renders any
takeover attempt as burdensome for the acquirer thereby protecting incumbent
management.
3.2. Methodology
CAPEX are subject to both industry- and country-effects and are sensitive to company
size.
7 Consequently, the dependent variable CAPEX was standardized by SR so as to
account for firm size. This standardized measure of CAPEX is also held to the industry
median value as in Gompers et al. (2003), since service and financial companies invest
less in fixed assets than highly capital intensive basic industrial companies. Industry
classifications are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard of 10 sectors
retrieved through Worldscope. A finer industry classification was not used so as to have
more significant median adjusted values. In addition to controlling for sector effects,
we account for country differences using dummy variables.
The association between CAPEX and investor-sensitive corporate governance
measures is evaluated using the following pooled OLS model:






gkCk,it þ eit, ð1Þ
where CAPEXit represents CAPEX of firm i in period t and are scaled by SR and net
of the industry median value. C is a vector of i control variables in period t. For the
CAPEX regressions, these are the logarithm of price-to-book ratio (log PB), Tobin’s q,
SG3Y, CFS, CR, 1-year lagged CR and DA. Furthermore, dummy variables capture
country-specific differences and equal unity if a company is located in a specific country
(zero otherwise). Unlike Gompers et al. (2003) we opt for a pooled framework so as to
utilize the database to the fullest extent. The model also uses time-fixed effects and
adjusts for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980).
The reason behind incorporating log PB, Tobin’s q and SG3Y is that all can be
interpreted as proxies for growth opportunities (Tobin’s q), investment potential
(log PB) and capital demand (SG3Y). CFS and CR capture cash flow effects and excess
cash disposal for investments. On the other hand, Gov is the variable that captures the
7 We note, for example, that the data for the United Kingdom (unlike rest of Europe) includes listed REITs
(notably British Land, Land Securities, BAA and others), whose very high CAPEX stand in contrast to
the very low financial sector median value. There are also some privatized companies, notably Railtrack
PLC, and very young companies, notably RyanAir, that have invested far more than mature firms in
related sectors.
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 451Table 3. Time-series average values of deminor scores and financials per sector from 1996 to 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sector RDS TD DCG BSF Total CAPEX/SR PB Q SG3Y CFS CR DA
Energy 6.3233 3.4233 6.0694 5.1682 20.9842 0.1111 3.0332 1.5324 0.1278 0.1442 0.0748 0.1891
Materials 6.6539 5.5614 5.9274 5.0696 23.2122 0.0791 2.3913 0.8084 0.0736 0.1294 0.0896 0.2726
Industrials 6.2954 4.3089 5.8769 4.9716 21.4529 0.0931 3.1002 1.5723 0.1377 0.1754 0.1386 0.2419
Consumer discr. 6.5366 4.5787 5.9421 5.0533 22.0039 0.0712 3.2621 1.5272 0.0802 0.1180 0.1464 0.2724
Consumer staples 6.5557 4.1340 6.3155 5.3892 22.3944 0.0491 6.3535 1.3745 0.0709 0.1127 0.1265 0.3208
Health care 6.5041 3.6641 5.6955 4.6690 20.1379 0.0797 6.0111 2.8578 0.1328 0.1753 0.2839 0.1765
Financials 6.4465 4.4799 5.8189 4.9322 21.5353 0.0862 2.4569 0.2754 0.1105 0.2045 0.0365 0.2717
Information tech. 6.1665 3.9306 5.6197 4.6443 20.3611 0.0962 7.2075 8.7372 0.1953 0.0975 0.3629 0.1865
Telecom services 6.2092 2.2663 5.9643 4.7698 19.2096 0.2127 5.1657 1.2817 0.1534 0.2025 0.1647 0.3489
Utilities 6.2651 3.2613 6.0125 5.3465 20.8854 0.1819 1.9478 0.6599 0.1242 0.3365 0.0835 0.3220
Note: This table shows time-series average values of the four Deminor subscores and financials of the 10 sectors in the European sample. Columns 1 until 5 show averages of the governance
scores whereas the remaining columns present averages of the dependent variables (columns 6 and 7) and the control variables (columns 8 to 12). The abbreviations and meanings for the
variables in columns (1) until (5) are as defined in the text and in Appendix A. CAPEX/SR resembles capital expenditures scaled by sales revenue. Q is the market value of the assets divided
by the replacement value of the assets. CR is cash and cash equivalents over net assets (balance sheet total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). PB ratio is market value of the firm’s














.corporate governance dimensions of firm i at time t. The four elements of corporate
governance are highly correlated (Table 4) and this limits the value of simultaneous
incorporation of the variables into the regression equation. We observed a very strong
correlation between the total score on corporate governance (Total) and the TD.
On this count, this might be caused by the fact that many European companies’
corporate governance are rated either lowly or very highly. Thus, a high score in this
category may strongly influence the total score. Moreover, BSF and DCG correlate
very highly with 0.83, possibly hinting at the fact that those scores measure fairly
similar items.
Potential concerns about endogeneity of corporate governance and CAPEX are not
apparent in the data. Even though one could assume larger companies (in terms of SR
or balance sheet TA) would be more able to comply with international governance
standards, correlations to firm size are below 0.1. Papers investigating the endogeneity
of corporate board structures have focused on the CEO’s involvement in the selection
process rather than the firm characteristics that may influence the selection process
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1998). In order to ensure methodological robustness,
we use a cross-sectional regression approach as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) with the
following model:
CAPEXit ¼ aiþb1GovitþyitCitþeit, ð2Þ
where Gov and C are as outlined in the pooled OLS regression equation. The signif-
icance of the time series average is tested with a t-statistic for eight degrees of freedom.
Since the results are qualitatively the same, we opted for the more powerful pooled OLS
setting and report only those results.
4. Results of empirical estimations
Having elaborated on the databases and methodology used to test the research hypoth-
eses, we turn to the empirical results. Table 5 below summarizes our expected results
as summarized in Section 2.1. Note that for some sub-aggregate scores we cannot infer
the direction of statistical association. The results for the three regions are reported
separately. If we observe similar effects despite different formal governance regimes
and legal systems, this may be evidence for convergence in corporate management
behaviour in Europe. Region one including Belgium, France, Germany and
The Netherlands is analysed before we proceed to the one-tiered region two and the
United Kingdom.
4.1. Findings for region one
This region is comprised of two-tiered systems of corporate governance and is made-up
of countries with more established governance codes. Table 6 below, summarizes the
regression results.
Table 6 reveals highly negative and significant results for Deminor’s Total gover-
nance score, the TD, DCG and BSF. This suggests that these elements of corporate
governance negatively affect CAPEX in excess of the industry median. Hence,
companies with less takeover defences, companies which are more transparent and
companies with better internal controls invest less than their industry peers. Moreover,
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 453Table 4. Correlation matrix between governance variables, dependent variables and control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
RDS TD DCG BSF TOTAL
CAPEX/SR
(ADJ) PB Q SG3Y CFS CR DA
RDS 1
TD 0.4864 1
DCG 0.2322 0.3632 1
BSF 0.2467 0.4420 0.8314 1
TOTAL 0.6014 0.8754 0.7208 0.7662 1
CAPEX/SR (ADJ)  0.0022  0.0636 0.0306 0.0262  0.0226 1
PB  0.0279  0.0053  0.0279  0.0216  0.0213 0.0097 1
Q  0.0079  0.0369  0.0607  0.0279  0.0455 0.0838 0.0532 1
SG3Y  0.0116  0.0298  0.1399  0.0951  0.0794 0.1365 0.0071 0.1067 1
CFS  0.0376  0.1097  0.0649  0.0083  0.0896 0.0810 0.0083 0.0820  0.0318 1
CR  0.0054  0.0318 0.0150  0.0001  0.0155 0.0454 0.0204 0.3412  0.0037  0.0013 1
DA  0.0297  0.0256 0.0257 0.0055  0.0126 0.1301  0.0130  0.1328 0.0144  0.0944  0.1899 1
Note: Table resembles a bivariate correlation matrix between the governance variables and the financial variables of interest. The sample comprises 3,950 firm level annual observations.
(1) RDS stands for Rights and Duties of Shareholders, (2) TD Range of Takeover Defenses, (3) DCG Disclosure on Corporate Governance, (4) BSF Board Structure and Functioning,
(5) Total is the sum of (1) until (4). (6) CAPEX/SR (ADJ) is CAPEX scaled by sales revenue and adjusted for the industry median. (7) PB is price-to-book ratio. (8) Q Tobin’s q (market
value of assets over the replacement value of assets). (9) SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth. (10) CFS is cash flow to sales. (11) CR is the company’s cash ratio [cash and cash equivalents














.a high overall score on the quality of corporate governance contributes significantly
to a reduction of CAPEX. What is remarkable, and contrary to expectations and prior
research, is the positive coefficient on RDS. The multivariate regression involving all
four governance variables confirms these findings. The lack of significance of DCG in
model 6 is possibly attributable to a high correlation with BSF.
4.2. Findings for region two
Having observed the results of the two-tier region one, we turn to the results for region
two. Section 4.1 revealed negative effects on almost all corporate governance variables
using industry-adjusted CAPEX. Recall that region two was constituted by one-tier
governance systems drawn from continental European countries with recently
established codes of corporate governance (Table 1).
Table 7 reveals that region one findings are shared, to some extent, with region two.
The Total’s coefficient is not significant but is still slightly negative. The TD also bears a
negative and significant effect in region two. This is manifested by the P-value that is
below 5%. Remarkably, both DCG and BSF are positive and significant, which stands
in stark contrast to region one. Results from the multivariate regression equation are
somewhat different. Even though DCG is still positive, BSF is now negative and not
significant whereas RDS is positive in this regression as it is in region one. We note that
the model’s fit in this region is better than region one.





relationship Related literature/hypothesis motivation
1. Total ?   Offsetting effects within categories might blur the
overall effect on CAPEX, no inference on
direction of causality
2. RDS  /þþ /? Related to Gompers et al. (2003); difference is the
European market and focus on RDS only.
Therefore, as such previously not investigated.
3. TD    More takeover defenses lead to less pressure to create
shareholder value as a barrier to being taken over.
More entrenched managers fear losing their job less.
4. DCG  /?  /þ Not investigated before; no causality inferred.
Directors more accountable for their decisions
5. BSF    /þ Clark et al. (2006); Wrigley and Currah (2003); notion
that lax internal controls give leeway in CAPEX.
More frequent and rigid controls and audits lead to
fewer investments in absolute terms.
Regional differences No Hardly Wo ´ jcik (2006), Coffee (2005) and Hebb (2006) show
differences between governance systems and a trend
towards convergence.
Note: We list our expected/hypothesized statistical association of each corporate governance variable with the dependent
variable (i.e. CAPEX) according to related prior studies or motivated from theory. We do not report our expected
coefficients concerning the control variables, since we are to our best knowledge the first to incorporate these to examine
investment behaviour.
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 455Table 6. Pooled OLS regression results for region 1 (Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands)
Model log PB Q SG3Y CFS CR CR-1 DA Total RDS TD DCG BSF ASQR n
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0.112 736
Note: This table shows results of pooled ordinary least squares regressions in region 1. Models 1 until 5 have different corporate governance subscores as independent variables. The
dependent variable CAPEX is always capital expenditures (‘additions to fixed assets’) scaled by sales revenue and is net of the industry median. The coefficients are the results of the following
pooled least squares regression, where Govit is either of the five governance scores and Cit is a vector of control variables, which are outlined below. In model 6 we include all four governance
variables simultaneously.







Log PB is the natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio, and Q is as defined in the text. SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth and CFS is the cash flow to sales ratio of the company.
CR is the firm’s balance of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). CR-1 is the lagged cash ratio and DA is debt-to-total assets ratio. The five
governance variables are as defined in the text. P-values of the coefficients are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level are indicated with
 ,
   and
   , respectively. The model
uses country and time fixed effects. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) diagonal covariance matrix. ASQR in column (13) is the adjusted R
2 of the














.Table 7. Pooled OLS regression results for region 2 (Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden)
Model log PB Q SG3Y CFS CR CR-1 DA Total RDS TD DCG BSF ASQR n
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Note: This table shows results of pooled ordinary least squares regressions in region 2. Models 1 until 5 have different corporate governance subscores as independent variables. The
dependent variable CAPEX is always capital expenditures (‘additions to fixed assets’) scaled by sales revenue and is net of the industry median. The coefficients are the results of the following
pooled least squares regression, where Govit is either of the five governance scores and Cit is a vector of control variables, which are outlined below. In model 6 we include all four governance
variables simultaneously.







Log PB is the natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio, and Q is as defined in the text. SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth and CFS is the cash flow to sales ratio of the company.
CR is the firm’s balance of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). CR-1 is the lagged cash ratio and DA is debt-to-total assets ratio. The five
governance variables are as defined in the text. P-values of the coefficients are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level are indicated with
 ,
   and
   , respectively. The model
uses country and time fixed effects. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) diagonal covariance matrix. ASQR in column (13) is the adjusted R
2 of the



















































74.3. Findings for the United Kingdom and Ireland
We have noted the different effects of RDS, DCG and BSF on CAPEX in region one
and region two. The coefficients on the two latter variables are opposite to what was
observed for region one. Here, the results for the United Kingdom and Ireland are
summarized. If we observe similar effects on overall governance as in regions one and
two, we could interpret this as evidence of European convergence in corporate behav-
iour. Table 8 summarizes the results of the regressions.
As observed in the previous results for the UK, the Total coefficient is negative and
significant. The coefficient on the RDS is again positive but not significant. Confirming
the findings from regions one and two, a high score on the TD has a negative impact
on CAPEX. DCG and BSF have negative and significant effects on CAPEX. Results
from model 6 strongly confirm these results. RDS is positive and significant in the
multivariate regression, even though DCG loses its significance. In sum, the results
from region three are more similar to region one than to region two. Furthermore, the
TD and the Total governance score have consistently negative effects on CAPEX.
Given the similar effects on this coefficient in regions one and two, we can suggest
that there has been pan-European convergence in management behaviour with respect
to shareholder value and investment.
4.4. Robustness checks
In order to examine how the distinction between region one and region two may affect
our results, we tested the model for the whole of continental Europe.
8 The results are
shown in the Table 9.
We observe that the same effects hold for regions one and two combined. The RDS
coefficient appears to drop-out in this grouping, since the effect is inconclusive and
far from conventional significance thresholds. The significance of the TD persists with
a very low P-value. DCG and BSF continue to be negative and significant. The overall
coefficient on Total is also negative and significant. In model 6, we note that the RDS
coefficient becomes more significant. Therefore, we conclude that the effects of region
one dominate region two especially in the area of disclosure and BSF since the over-
all effect is negative. These findings are confirmed when the United Kingdom and
Ireland are added to the sample.
9 The effect of RDS between the regions is apparently
cancelled-out, which renders this coefficient insignificant. TD still has a significantly
negative effect, as does the Total coefficient. BSF and DCG are highly significant and
negative. In the multivariate regression, the RDS effect becomes positive and significant
again, while TD remains to be highly significant.
As an additional check on the robustness of the aforementioned findings, the anal-
ysis was conducted excluding financial companies (every company in the sample with
a GICS code of 40). Financial companies constitute a large part ( 20%) of the dataset
and might behave differently in terms of investment and some ratios are less straight-
forward to interpret (e.g. log PB). The financial sector invests less in fixed assets than
8 We also tested for any differences in the results by subperiods. This is difficult given the fact that
1997–2000 would include three static years of governance data. Nevertheless, the results were negative but
weaker for 1997–2000 compared with 2001–2005.
9 We do not report results of this analysis but they are available upon request.
458 . Bauer et al.Table 8. Pooled OLS regression results for region 3 (United Kingdom, Ireland)
Model log PB Q SG3Y CFS CR CR-1 DA Total RDS TD DCG BSF ASQR n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1  0.071
(0.000)
   
0.020
(0.007)
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(0.004)
































Note: This table shows results of pooled ordinary least squares regressions in region 3. Models 1 until 5 have different corporate governance subscores as independent variables. The
dependent variable CAPEX is always capital expenditures (‘additions to fixed assets’) scaled by sales revenue and is net of the industry median. The coefficients are the results of the following
pooled least squares regression, where Govit is either of the five governance scores and Cit is a vector of control variables, which are outlined below. In model 6 we include all four governance
variables simultaneously.







Log PB is the natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio, and Q is as defined in the text. SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth and CFS is the cash flow to sales ratio of the company.
CR is the firm’s balance of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). CR-1 is the lagged cash ratio and DA is debt-to-total assets ratio. The five
governance variables are as defined in the text. P-values of the coefficients are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level are indicated with
 ,
   and
   , respectively. The model
uses country and time fixed effects. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) diagonal covariance matrix. ASQR in column (13) is the adjusted R
2 of the



















































9Table 9. Pooled OLS regression results for continental Europe (Europe excluding United Kingdom and Ireland)
Model log PB Q SG3Y CFS CR CR-1 DA Total RDS TD DCG BSF ASQR n
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Note: This table shows results of pooled ordinary least squares regressions in continental Europe. Models 1 until 5 have different corporate governance subscores as independent variables.
The dependent variable CAPEX is always capital expenditures (‘additions to fixed assets’) scaled by sales revenue and is net of the industry median. The coefficients are the results of the
following pooled least squares regression, where Govit is either of the five governance scores and Cit is a vector of control variables, which are outlined below. In model 6 we include all four
governance variables simultaneously.







Log PB is the natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio, and Q is as defined in the text. SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth and CFS is the cash flow to sales ratio of the company.
CR is the firm’s balance of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). CR-1 is the lagged cash ratio and DA is debt-to-total assets ratio. The five
governance variables are as defined in the text. P-values of the coefficients are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level are indicated with
 ,
   and
   , respectively. The model
uses country and time fixed effects. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) diagonal covariance matrix. ASQR in column (13) is the adjusted R
2 of the














.most other industries. Nevertheless, excluding financials and conducting the same
analysis as shown in Table 10 hardly changes the results.
The Total governance score still has a highly significant coefficient with a P-value
below 0.1%. The same finding holds for the TD and BSF with P-values below 1%.
The CG coefficient is significant with a P-value between 1% and 5%. We observe
a significantly positive coefficient on the RDS. Therefore, the inclusion of financial
companies did not materially affect the results. Overall, the TD has a consistently
negative and significant effect on industry adjusted CAPEX. But we also observe
different effects of DCG and BSF between the regions. The coefficient on the RDS is
positive but not significant.
10
4.5. Generalized methods of moments
A possible concern in our analysis of the governance effect on CAPEX is the potential
serial correlation in the residuals.
11 This might cast doubt on the validity of OLS
regressions since significance could be achieved by CAPEX hardly changing over time.
In order to tackle this possible problem, we adopt an instrumental generalized methods
of moments (GMM) approach as in Cochrane (2005) and Campbell et al. (1997).
Unlike OLS or maximum likelihood estimation, GMM does not require the data
generating process to be known. In order to estimate the parameters  , GMM can
infer from sample moments to population moments without requirements such as the
absence of heteroskedasticity or serial correlation. Hence the adoption of GMM results
in very powerful and robust estimates. The general equation that minimizes the crite-
rion function q is as follows:
q ¼   mð Þ
0Wn   mð Þ, ð3Þ
where W (weighting matrix) is proportional to the variance of the moments m. Hence,
the optimal weighting matrix equals WGMM ¼f Asy:Var½
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p     mnð Þ g 1. As instruments,
we chose lagged values of the control variables in order to overidentify the moment
equations   mð Þ. As GMM weights, we employed period weights and still account for
heteroskedasticity using White’s correction. Using this approach does not materially
affect our results.
12 We conclude that our findings are robust with respect to potential
serial correlation in the error terms.
5. Practice of European corporate governance
Do more transparent companies with better internal controls and less takeover defences
invest less than their industry peers? Our results provide evidence that these elements of
investor-sensitive corporate governance have significant negative effects on the CAPEX
of European companies. Moreover, we find, by and large, the same effects across
the three European governance regions that are used to test for systemic regime effects.
For portfolio investors dependent upon global financial markets for management
10 We also conducted tests for the period of 2000–2005 and concluded that the backfilling procedure does
not significantly statistically affect our results (available from the authors).
11 We are grateful to Rik Frehen for suggesting this approach.
12 Tables and results are available upon request.
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 461Table 10. Pooled OLS regression results for Europe (excluding financial companies)
Model log PB Q SG3Y CFS CR CR-1 DA Total RDS TD DCG BSF ASQR n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1  0.024
(0.004)
   
0.013
(0.001)
   
0.071
(0.005)
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Note: This table shows results of pooled ordinary least squares regressions in whole Europe and excludes financial companies (i.e. all companies having a GICS code of 40). Models 1 until 5
have different corporate governance subscores as independent variables. The dependent variable CAPEX is always capital expenditures (‘additions to fixed assets’) scaled by sales revenue and
is net of the industry median. The coefficients are the results of the following pooled least squares regression, where Govit is either of the five governance scores and Cit is a vector of control
variables, which are outlined below. In model 6 we include all four governance variables simultaneously.







Log PB is the natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio, and Q is as defined in the text. SG3Y is trailing 3-year sales growth and CFS is the cash flow to sales ratio of the company.
CR is the firm’s balance of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (total assets minus cash and cash equivalents). CR-1 is the lagged cash ratio and DA is debt-to-total assets ratio. The five
governance variables are as defined in the text. P-values of the coefficients are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level are indicated with
 ,
   and
   , respectively. The model
uses country and time fixed effects. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using White’s (1980) diagonal covariance matrix. ASQR in column (13) is the adjusted R
2 of the














.discipline, there is a significant negative coefficient on the TD across all regions and in
the aggregate pan-European sample. This particular score is more comprehensive than
the Gompers et al. (2003) G-score since it incorporates ownership and capital structure.
These findings are in-line with related findings by Daines and Klausner (2001) who
point out that anti-takeover provisions increase agency costs. Moreover, they conclude
that the return on investment is largest when the firm concerned has been subject to
a hostile takeover. By their assessment, openness to the market for corporate control
induces management to operate more efficiently (hence the TD negative coefficient).
Intriguing results were also found for the coefficients on disclosure and BSF: it was
shown that these coefficients had persistently negative effects on industry-adjusted
CAPEX in region one and region three. While the former category refers to the trans-
parency of firm governance, the latter variable captures the independence, the insider/
outsider mix and the committee formation of the board—consequently, the governance
potential of a firm in relation to investment decision making. Recall that poor board
functioning and a lack of internal control systems were the governance failures that
allowed empire-building at Royal Ahold. Less transparent governance allows manage-
ment to exploit the ambiguities inherent in any governance regime and can allow
managers to conceal value-destroying projects and perks.
Whereas our BSF’s result matched our theoretical expectations of a negative rela-
tionship, in Table 5 DCG’s negative coefficient was not inferred previously. Similarly,
the positive coefficient on the RDS is a finding that does not appear in prior research
and may appear odd. Recent academic discussion reveals that the role that the RDS
may play in corporate governance is rather ambiguous. Some legal scholars argue that
‘active investor involvement [...] disrupts [...] the centralization of essentially non-
reviewable decision making authority in the board of directors’ (Bainbridge, 2006).
The coefficient on DCG is not significant in all settings and a deeper exploration is
required in further research.
Most importantly, our results have significant implications for understanding
the nature and performance of competing European regimes of corporate governance.
The study focused on three distinct European regions and investigated the relationship
between corporate governance and shareholder value in each region and then across
Europe. The overall effect of corporate governance (the Total score) on CAPEX is
consistently negative. Results are very similar across the regions and in the pooled
sample even though the underlying formal structures of corporate governance are quite
distinct by nation–state. This result implies that managers of large firms tend to respond
to common investor-driven standards of corporate governance irrespective of their
home of incorporation. Apparently, European companies opt less for retained earnings
and more for the Anglo-American approach of distributing excess cash flow to share-
holders with variable payout ratios (cf. Dore, 2000).
In effect, our results suggest that whatever the formal design and structure of a
country’s model of corporate governance, portfolio investors are able to exert pressure
on the managers of large firms to act in ways consistent with shareholder value rather
than stakeholder value (short-term rather than long-term value). This is an important
finding, since it tends to discount the significance of national rules and regulations
in the face of global financial market imperatives (as suggested by Clark and
Wo ´ jcik, 2007).
In this regard, the most important governance effect was found for the variable that
is the least regulated among the four categories throughout Europe, namely the TD.
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 463Even though EU recommendations to abstain from the use of anti-takeover measures
exist, regulations to this effect hardly ever appear in European countries’ corporate
governance codes.
13 The Spanish Aldama Report (2003), for example, points out that
‘the adoption of protective measures aimed at preventing takeovers [...] should also
require the approval of the Shareholders’ Meeting’ (Section IV, 1.3). This constrains
incumbents’ ability to entrench but does not prohibit this behaviour. Likewise, the
Dutch Tabaksblat Code (2003) does not include ‘best practice provisions on the
permissible use of anti-takeover measures in (hostile) takeover situations’ (Section
56–59). Other governance codes of the countries in our sample do not address takeovers
or merely recommend the procedures concerning the submission of takeover bids.
Hence, the European market for corporate control is only loosely regulated but
perhaps underestimated in terms of its effect on management behaviour. That this result
is strongest in region three is not surprising since the UK is characterized by a high
degree of dispersed ownership and a relatively liquid stock market. Therein, the market
for corporate control is an important disciplining force for managers of this region.
Region one is made up of countries where transparency and objective board functioning
have been heavily promoted recently. This might explain these variables’ strong effects
on CAPEX.
A further surprising finding is the positive and significant coefficients on DCG and
BSF in region two. Apparently, companies incorporated in one-tier structured countries
with recent governance codes invest more the more transparent they are and the more
independent board and internal controls are managed. This result is opposite to that
in regions one and three. However, when combining region one with region two in
a pan-European sample, we note that the negative effects on these variables dominate
the positive effects. Further, a negative effect for both TD and Total in a region with
different board structures, a different legal system and a less established governance
code gives in our view even stronger evidence of convergence in the practice of corporate
governance. Returning to our question, whether the Anglo-American or the continental
European approach dominates manager behaviour, we clearly reject the latter. It seems
that market-related elements of corporate governance have the effect of disciplining
managers to distribute revenue rather than retain earnings.
6. Conclusions
Using a unique database on the governance ratings of European companies from 1997
to 2005 provided by Deminor, and combining it with financial data from Worldscope,
we were able to establish a statistically significant negative relationship between
investor-sensitive corporate governance and company investment. This is stronger in
the continental European region that comprises predominantly two-tier structured
companies whereas the unitary board region has a weaker but still consistent result.
The results for the UK and Ireland are stronger in magnitude and were in the
13 In the EU, the 2004 Directive on takeover bids (Official Journal L 142, 30/04/2004) seeks to encourage
the ‘proper functioning of financial markets’ requiring (Article 3) that company boards ‘must act in the
best interests of the company as a whole’ when considering takeover bids while (Article 11) denies the use
of defensive measures in such circumstances. However, it is also widely appreciated that the Directive
(Article 12) also allows member-states the right to not require companies to comply with these
regulations.
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especially pronounced. The effect still holds even if we pool all companies together into
a pan-European dataset. In effect, the Anglo-American governance system serves as
a market-reference point for the governance of large continental European firms.
Robustness checks such as excluding financial companies do not alter our results.
Moreover, we are able to show that our results are robust even in the case of serial
correlation.
In light of the fact that European policymakers have sought to ‘reform’ companies’
governance structures by the introduction of governance codes, it is interesting that
the least regulated element—the TD—is the most significant element disciplining cor-
porate managers. Companies adopting fewer anti-takeover provisions spend signifi-
cantly less than their industry peers. This suggests that the global market for corporate
control is underestimated in terms of its disciplining effect on corporate managers.
Equally, this suggests that theorists of corporate governance that emphasize the
inherited governance traditions of nation–states may over-estimate the significance of
formal regulatory structures. In effect, our results suggest that as global financial
markets continue to integrate, and as portfolio investment managers expand their
interests to the four corners of the globe, market-standards of governance may come
to dominate formal regimes of governance in ways that discount the significance of
the latter.
This conclusion, though tentative and obviously specific to our research, is under-
pinned by related findings with respect to companies’ disclosure practices and the
quality of board structures and their functioning. We are able to show that the more
transparent are the governance practices of companies the less likely managers invest
beyond the industry median. Similarly, our results suggest that better-functioning
boards arrive at more market-sensitive investment decision making. Therefore, the
European market for corporate governance can serve as a substitute for national
governance codes and regulations if companies converge to Anglo-American practices
so to appeal to the interests of institutional investors. Our analysis provides evidence to
the effect that European companies increasing focus upon short-term shareholder value
in ways consistent with Anglo-American practices.
Of course, our results should be treated with some caution. In their paper, Gompers
et al. (2003) note that their G-score, which is constructed by enumerating entrenching-
and anti-takeover devices, can be a symptom of corporate culture rather than manage-
ment behaviour. Thus, a low score on corporate governance need not necessarily be a
consequence of management’s intentions but can also be determined by (unknown)
external variables. The authors also note that there might be some ‘hardly quantifiable
variable’ that determines corporate governance structures apart from managers’
entrenchment motives. Similarly, an omitted-variable bias might affect our results if the
variable is correlated with either of the regressors under examination. That is, CAPEX
might also be driven by some other variable beyond being a value- or a growth stock
(log PB), realizing growth opportunities (Tobin’s q) or satisfying investment demand
(SG3Y). Since we followed prior researchers’ arguments and intuition, we are confident
that we control for the most obvious factors.
Some critics oppose the increased reliance on commercial databases that quantita-
tively rate firms’ corporate governance structures and construct metrics out of qualita-
tive information. Sonnenfeld (2004) argued that rating companies rely on myths rather
than evidence in arriving at objective judgments. However, our use of the Deminor data
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 465is premised upon our own knowledge and experience with the data and our assessment
of the skills and expertise of their team of specialists. In any event, we note that the
database is used extensively by institutional investors to make their investment
decisions. Even if the database were misleading on crucial issues, it is more robust than
the method used by Gompers et al. (2003) and has the added virtue that it is, in fact,
data that actually affects global investment decision making.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Jeroen Derwall, Ewald Engelen, William Megginson, Andrei Simonov, David
Yermack and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous drafts. Seminar
participants at Oxford University Centre for the Environment, CFS-ECGTN participants in
Eltville (Germany), participants at the 5th Corporate Finance Day in Louvain-la-Neuve
(Belgium) and Rik Frehen, a discussant at the internal colloquium at Maastricht University,
helped clarify our argument. We thank ISS Europe and Kristof Ho Tiu for providing the
database on corporate governance. We would also like to thank Ashby Monk and Dariusz
Wo ´ jcik for sharing research on closely related themes and for their thoughts on a previous draft.
All errors and omissions are our responsibility.
References
Aguilera, R. V., Ruppe, D. E., Williams, C. A., Ganapathi, J. (2007) Putting the S back in
corporate social responsibility: a multilevel theory of social change in organizations. Academy
of Management Review, 32: 836–863.
Aldama Report. (2003) Madrid: Government of Spain. Available online through the European
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI): http://www.ecgi.org. [Accessed 5 March 2006].
Bainbridge, S. M. (2006) Director primacy and shareholder disempowerment – response. Harvard
Law Review, 119: 1735–1758.
Bauer, R., Guenster, N., Otten, R. (2004) Empirical evidence on corporate governance in Europe.
The effect on stock returns, firm value and performance. Journal of Asset Management, 5(2):
91–104.
Becht, M., Bolton, P., Ro ¨ ell, A. (2003) Corporate governance and control. In G. Constantinides,
A. Harris, R. Stulz (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Finance – Volume 1A: Corporate
Finance. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishers.
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2003) Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and
managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111: 1043–1075.
Burkart, M. and Panunzi, F. (2006) Takeovers. ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 118/2006.
Available online at: www.ssrn.com.
Campbell, J. Y., Lo, A. W., MacKinley, A. C. (eds) (1997) The Econometrics of Financial
Markets. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Caprasse, J. N. (2005) Trends & Ratings 2003. Corporate Governance Research and Ratings.
Available online at: http://www.deminor.org/. [Accessed 5 August 2005].
Cestone, G. and Cespa, G. (2007) Corporate social responsibility and managerial entrenchment.
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 16(3): 741–771.
Chhaochharia, V. and Grinstein, Y. (2007) Corporate governance and firm value: the impact of
the 2002 governance rules. Journal of Finance, 62: 1789–1825.
Clark, G. L. and Wo ´ jcik, D. (2007) The Geography of Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, G. L., Wo ´ jcik, D., Bauer, R. (2006) Geographically dispersed ownership and inter-market
stock price arbitrage – Ahold’s crisis of corporate governance and its implications for global
standards. Journal of Economic Geography, 6: 303–322.
Cochrane, J. H. (2005) Asset Pricing, revised edn. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Coffee, J. C. (2005) A theory of corporate scandals: why the US and Europe differ. Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 21(2): 198–211.
466 . Bauer et al.Cremers, K. J. M., Nair, V. B., Wei, C. (2007) Governance mechanism and bond prices. Review of
Financial Studies, 20: 1359–1388.
Daines, R. and Klausner, M. (2001) Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Anti-takeover
protection in IPOs. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 17: 83–120.
Damodaran, A. (2002) Investment Valuation. New York: Wiley & Sons.
de Jong, A., DeJong, D. V., Mertens, G., Roosenboom, P. (2005) Royal ahold: a failure of
corporate governance. ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, No. 67/2005. Available online at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract¼663504.
Dittmar, A. and Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007) Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings.
Journal of Financial Economics, 83: 599–634.
Dore, R. (2000) Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism. Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
European Corporate Governance Institute. (2006) Codes and principles, research and publications.
Available online at: www.ecgi.org.
Fama, E. F. and MacBeth, J. (1973) Risk, return and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of
Political Economy, 81: 607–636.
Gertler, M. S. (2001) Best practice? Geography, learning and the institutional limits to strong
convergence. Journal of Economic Geography, 1: 5–26.
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., Metrick, A. (2003) Corporate governance and equity prices.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 107–155.
Gordon, J. N. and Roe, M. J. (eds) (2004) Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopt, K. J., Kanda, H., Roe, M. J., Wymeersch, E., Prigge, S. (eds) (1998) Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hebb, T. (2006) The economic inefficiency of secrecy: pension fund investors’ corporate trans-
parency concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 63: 385–405.
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, S. E. (1988) The determinants of board composition. RAND
Journal of Economics, 19: 589–606.
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, S. E. (1998) Endogeneously chosen boards and their monitoring
role of the CEO. American Economic Review, 88: 96–118.
Jensen, M. C. (2000) A Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (2002) Investor protection and
corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 57: 1147–1170.
McCahery, J. A., Moerland, P., Raaijmakers, T., Renneboog, T. (eds) (2002) Corporate
Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Monk, A. H. B. (2008) Institutional change in the era of globalization? Available online at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1082887.
Pagano, M. and Volpin, P. F. (2005) Managers, workers, and corporate control. Journal of
Finance, 60: 841–869.
Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2007) Variegated capitalisms. Progress in Human Geography, 31.
Renders, A. and Gaeremynck, A. (2006) Corporate governance and performance – controlling
for sample selection bias and endogeneity. K.U. Leuven AFI Working Paper No. 0606.
Roe, M. J. (2006) Legal origins, politics, and modern stock markets. Harvard Law Review, 120:
460–527.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997) A survey on corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52:
737–783.
Sonnenfeld, J. (2004) Good governance and the misleading myths of bad metrics. Academy of
Management Executive, 18: 108–113.
Stein, J. (1988) Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy, 96: 61–80.
Tabaksblat Code. (2003) Amsterdam: Netherlands Government. Available online through the
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI): http://www.ecgi.org. [Accessed 5 March
2006].
Tirole, J. (2001) Corporate governance. Econometrica, 69: 1–35.
Titman, S., Wei, J. K. C., Xie, F. (2004) Capital investments and stock returns. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39: 677–700.
White, H. (1980) A Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48: 817–838.
The emerging market for European corporate governance . 467Wilhelm, W. J. and Downing, J. D. (2001) Information Markets: What Business Can Learn From
Financial Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Wo ´ jcik, D. (2006) Convergence in corporate governance: evidence from Europe and the challenge
for economic geography. Journal of Economic Geography, 6: 639–660.
Wo ´ jcik, D., Clark, G., Bauer, R. (2005) Corporate governance and cross-listing: evidence from
european companies. Working Paper, Oxford University and Maastricht University.
Wrigley, N. and Currah, A. (2003) The stresses of retail internationalization: lessons from royal
Ahold’s experience in latin America. International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer
Research, 13: 221–243.
Yermack, D. (2006) Flights of fancy: corporate jets, CEO perquisites and inferior shareholder
returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 80: 211–242.
Appendix A
Description of Deminor’s rating algorithm (Caprasse, 2005)
The research enables the user to compare corporate governance standards and practices
across companies with reference to four corporate governance categories [see Deminor
Ratings S. A. Brochure, p. 5. Brussels, Belgium. Available online at World Wide Web:
www.deminor.org (accessed Retrieved 5 August 2005)].
Rights and duties of shareholders
Includes criteria concerning the respect of the one-share one-vote one-dividend
principle, voting right restrictions, voting issues, shareholder proposals, voting proce-
dures and maintenance of pre-emptive rights.
Range of takeover defenses
Examines the presence and strength of anti-takeover devices such as poison pills, golden
parachutes, core shareholdings, extensive cross-shareholdings and co-option systems
that could be used to protect the company from a hostile takeover and to disenfranchise
shareholders. Further to this, the dilution effects and economic barriers to such
instruments are examined.
Disclosure on corporate governance
Analyses the transparency of a corporation as measured by the quantity and quality of
non-financial information on its governance structure such as diversity and indepen-
dence for board members, board committees, director remuneration, auditors’ fees and
rotation, accounting standards, information on major shareholders of the company,
environmental information, etc.
Board structure and functioning
Examines all issues relating to the governance of a board such as independent directors,
division of the role of the chairman and chief executive, election of the board, director
remuneration, the workings and authorities of board committees, etc.
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Description of control variables
(1) (2) (3)
Abbreviation Variable Description
PB Price-to-book ratio Price-to-book current—Price-current/book value per share
SG3Y Trailing three-year
sales growth
Three year annual growth represents [(Current year’s net
sales or revenues/net sales or revenues 4 years ago,
reduced to a compound annual rate) 1] 100.
Q Tobin’s q Tobin’s Q—it is the market value of assets divided by the
replacement value of assets. The market value is
approximated by the difference between the sum of the
book value of assets and the market value and the book
value of equity. The replacement value of the assets is
simply the book value of assets.
CFS Cash flow to
sales ratio
Cash flow to sales represents funds from operations/net
sales or revenues 100.
CR Cash ratio Cash ratio—as defined by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007): cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets
(total assets minus cash and cash equivalents).
Debt Balance sheet
total debt
Total debt represents all interest bearing and capitalized




Total assets represent the sum of total current assets, long
term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidi-
aries, other investments, net property plant and equip-
ment and other assets.
SR Sales revenues Net sales or revenues represent gross sales and other
operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.
CAPEX Capital expenditures Capital expenditures—additions to fixed assets.
Country controls Country dummy—variable equals one if company belongs
to a particular country and is zero otherwise.
Note: We define the control variables that we use throughout our statistical analysis. All of the data was taken from
Worldscope. Since the statistical analysis makes exclusive use of ratios, we do not have to tackle currency effects between
the European countries under investigation.
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